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Why did the Nixon administration decide to offer nuclear assistance to France in 1970?  
Although France withdrew from NATO and President Richard Nixon publicly claimed that the 
U.S. would act as the “nuclear umbrella,” the Nixon administration initiated a secret nuclear 
assistance program of information sharing on ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons technology, and 
nuclear weapons safety to the French government. Given that atomic assistance inadvertently 
raises the likelihood of nuclear proliferation, the current literature suggests that nuclear 
assistance should be a rare occurrence and fails to provide a compelling explanation for why, and 
under what condition, a state may be willing to offer nuclear assistance to an ally. Through an 
examination of archival and secondary sources, I argue that the U.S. formulated its nuclear 
assistance policy to France in response to particular opportunities and incentives that were 
connected more to bilateral relations with France at the time than theories related to the threat or 
normative environment. This thesis challenges the current literature’s expectations and calls for a 


















When France announced its decision to develop its own nuclear capabilities in the 1950s 
and staged its first nuclear test ten years later, the U.S. publicly opposed to the development of 
nuclear forces by other states except those approved by NATO. As Washington was engaged in 
serious disputes with Paris over the organization of the Western alliance system, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), many U.S. officials expressed no interest in assisting or 
encouraging an independent nuclear force in a Western European country and called for the 
implementation of specific policies to prevent France from receiving any such aid. U.S. senior 
officials expressed concerns that that an independent French nuclear capability would provoke an 
arms race in Western Europe, and even trigger a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.1 As outlined 
in the National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 294, the Johnson administration 
asserted that the U.S. government would not engage in significant assistance affecting timing, 
quality or cost of the French nuclear program as long as the French strategic nuclear weapons are 
not committed to NATO.2  
However, by the end of the 1960s, President Richard Nixon’s administration reversed 
U.S. attitudes towards the French nuclear program. Open to the possibility of nuclear assistance 
to France, the Nixon administration charted a new course in U.S. nuclear policy. In 1969, U.S. 
officials began to secretly assist the French in developing and improving its own autonomous 
nuclear defense program from NATO. Between 1970-1973, the Nixon administration indirectly 
                                                 
1 Sean Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the 
Present (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 155. 
2“National Security Action Memorandum, NSAM 294, McGeorge Bundy to Secretary of State, 'US Nuclear 
and Strategic Delivery System Assistance to France',” April 20, 1964, History and Public Policy Program 
Digital Archive, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Security Council Files (NSCF), box 676, 
France vol. V 01 Feb 70-Apr 70. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research 
Update #2. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110246 
 7 
circumvented the Atomic Energy Act restrictions against the transfer of nuclear weapons design 
information by informing the French whether the steps they were taking in the right direction. In 
addition, Washington offered nuclear assistance in the form of technology components for 
multiple reentry vehicles and hardening of reentry vehicles (RVs/warheads). Through this covert 
strategy known as "negative guidance," U.S. officials helped the French “perfect their nuclear 
warheads.”3  
In this thesis, I seek to answer the following question: Why did the U.S., under the Nixon 
administration, decide to offer nuclear assistance to France? From a historical perspective, the 
timing of the U.S.-French nuclear assistance program is puzzling. In 1966, French President 
Charles De Gaulle’s withdrew of all French forces from NATO’s military integrated command. 
This greatly diminished America’s trust in France as a reliable ally and security partner against 
the Soviet Union.4 Yet amid this transatlantic crisis and public claims that the U.S. would 
continue to act as Europe’s “nuclear umbrella,” President Nixon was willing to accept and 
support the development of an autonomous nuclear force outside of NATO four years later. 
Moreover, the Nixon administration initiated this nuclear assistance program after the NPT was 
ratified and during the period of détente, raising questions about why U.S. officials at this time 
were willing to risk upsetting U.S. relations with the USSR. From a theoretical standpoint, the 
U.S.-French nuclear assistance program also illustrates an unusual case that deviates from the 
conventional theories’ expectations about the willingness of a state to offer nuclear assistance. 
As Matthew Fuhrmann argues, a state faces significant trade-offs when it offers nuclear 
                                                 
3 William Burr, “U.S. Secret Assistance to the French Nuclear Program, 1969-1975: From "Fourth Country" to 
Strategic Partner,” The Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/us-secret-assistance-to-the-
french-nuclear-program-1969-1975-fourth-country-to-strategic 
4 Mary Nolan, The Transatlantic century: Europe and America, 1890-2010 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 284. 
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assistance. Given that the U.S. wishes to maintain a monopoly on nuclear weapons and that 
atomic assistance inadvertently raises the likelihood of nuclear proliferation, the Nixon 
administration should have had no incentives to offer nuclear assistance to the French.5 The 
discrepancies between the conventional wisdom and observation raise the question of whether 
other factors, such as alliance politics, were at work in causing U.S.-French cooperation in the 
nuclear realm. 
Although this thesis focuses on a historical case study of the Nixon administration, it  
addresses a significant gap in a burgeoning literature on nuclear weapons policy. Over the past 
fifteen years, political scientists have demonstrated a renewed interest in studying nuclear 
proliferation, in light of policy concerns about new proliferating states after the Cold War. 
This case study also has general applications to the study of the politics of nuclear assistance. 
The U.S.-French nuclear assistance program deals with several core questions that U.S. 
policymakers continue to grapple with today. For example, under what conditions does the U.S. 
wish to offer nuclear assistance to support the development of other nuclear states despite the 
risks of nuclear proliferation? When does the prevention of nuclear proliferation subordinate to 
other national interests? If a state has already acquired the bomb, under what conditions will the 
U.S. government impose counter proliferation policies, or merely accept the proliferation? 
Deepening our understanding of this interesting yet under-explored case also offers important 
policy implications for how, and the conditions in which, the U.S. may offer nuclear assistance 
to other nuclear states in the future.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Matthew Fuhrmann, "Spreading Temptation: Why Nuclear Export Strategies Backfire." In Atomic Assistance: 




Chapter I: Theorizing Nuclear Assistance 
 
 
I. Literature Review 
 
What are the conditions under which a state will be willing to offer nuclear assistance? In 
this thesis, I define “nuclear assistance” as the sharing and transfer of nuclear technology, 
materials and knowledge from an “assister” state to a recipient state designed to help the latter’s 
development nuclear program. This is distinct from “nuclear proliferation,” which refers to the 
pursuit of a nuclear weapon by a non-nuclear weapon state. While there is a robust and extensive 
set of literature that seeks to explain why states pursue or abandon nuclear weapons programs, 
few have examined what is arguably the more puzzling question: why do states provide sensitive 
nuclear assistance to other states? Specifically, why would a state be willing to offer nuclear 
assistance, given the likelihood that this might encourage nuclear proliferation to non-desirable 
states and/or non-state actors? Conventional wisdom suggests that given the anarchic and self-
help nature of the international system, states should face little incentive to offer nuclear 
assistance. First, it is in a state’s interest to keep the number of nuclear weapons states in 
international politics low because nuclear proliferation increases the risks for accidents, and 
generates other harmful side effects such as inadvertent escalation and regional instability that 
can distract a state from pursuing other strategic goals and interests. Second, states will want 
their own nuclear monopoly because of the relative advantage of nuclear weapons possession. 
Nuclear weapons allow a state to intimate or coerce against regional or international adversaries 
by removing the capability of one state to have complete military dominance and demonstrate 
their technological advancement. Given this, nuclear assistance should be a rare occurrence in 
international politics. Yet many nuclear states received some form of external assistance from 
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another nuclear state.6 For example, between 1959-1965, France provided Israel with sensitive 
nuclear assistance, and China assisted Pakistan in the 1980s.7 
The existing theoretical literature is sparse and unorganized but offers some explanations 
for why a state would offer nuclear assistance. Some scholars argue that there are sizable 
strategic incentives for a state to offer nuclear assistance, such as strengthening extended 
deterrence visa-a-vis a growing external threat. Others, such as Matthew Kroenig, suggest that a 
state may be willing to risk nuclear assistance to a relatively weaker state because it can help 
signal credible threats to an adversary. A final set of literature argues that states will offer 
nuclear assistance in search for economic profit. Despite these competing approaches, a central 
assumption among the literature is that a state will be willing to offer nuclear assistance under 
some condition in which it believes it can gain a strategic benefit significant enough to outweigh 
the risks of nuclear proliferation.  
Although existing scholarship has offered some diverse insights that may explain the 
factors that compel a state to offer nuclear assistance, there are several gaps that continue to exist 
in the theories. First, the majority of the literature fails the distinguish the type of relationship 
between the nuclear assister state and the recipient state. For states that are adversaries or not 
aligned with the U.S. it is obvious why the U.S. would adamantly oppose nuclear assistance. 
However, it is unclear whether nuclear assistance to an allied or “friendly” state provokes the 
same net negative geopolitical calculations. This distinction is important because some states 
have provided nuclear assistance to close military allies, especially during the Cold War period. 
                                                 
6 Kroenig similarly finds that sensitive nuclear assistance is positively correlated to a state’s acquisition of a 
nuclear bomb. 
7 Matthew Kroenig, “Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance,” The American 
Political Science Review 103, no. 1 (2009): 116. 
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Second, the literature assumes that the “nuclear assister” is one that is “underdeveloped” state. In 
practice, however, cases of nuclear assistance often include instances where the assister is a great 
power. These observations reveal that the literature would benefit from a more precise definition 
of “nuclear supplier” state, and a broader engagement with the political context in which nuclear 
assistance takes place. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The first section examines the 
competing explanations for nuclear assistance in international politics. The subsequent section 
highlights the limitations of the existing theories in explaining the U.S.-French case and 
advances the argument for a different analytical approach to address this question. I build on this 
observation and describe how different set of theories– such as alliance politics, nuclear 
nonproliferation norms and political opportunism – may help illuminate the conditions under 
which a state may be willing to offer nuclear assistance to an ally.  
 
1.1 Balance of power between two states 
 
Recent scholarship suggests that a critical factor in understanding the causes of nuclear  
 
assistance is the relative balance of power between the state offering nuclear assistance, and  
 
the state receiving the assistance. In “Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear  
 
Assistance,” Matthew Kroenig argues that the more powerful a nuclear state is relative to a  
 
potential nuclear recipient, the less likely it is to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. Here, a 
state is defined as “relatively powerful” if it has the ability to project military power over a 
particular state.8 According to Kroenig, the spread of nuclear weapons will threaten powerful 
nuclear states more than weaker states because the nuclear power benefits from the existing 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 115. 
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balance of power status quo. This argument builds on the assumption that nuclear weapons offers 
a state leverage against both its adversaries and weak states. Nuclear superiority, an advantage in 
the size, number, and sophistication of a nuclear arsenal relative to others, allows a state to gain a 
strategic advantage over particular states by influencing the states’ foreign policy.9 Thus, even if 
a friendly state acquires nuclear weapons, the relatively powerful nuclear state is constrained 
from using its conventional military power to its advantage.10 Therefore, states that have military 
superiority, such as the U.S., should be generally opposed to nuclear assistance because it 
contributes to nuclear proliferation and decreases their ability to use conventional military force 
against a particular state.  
Kroenig’s theory also suggests an interesting counterhypothesis: relatively powerful 
states may actually be more likely to provide nuclear assistance because it is able to defend and 
deter against a nuclear attack and will not feel threatened by nuclear proliferation.11 This 
hypothesis rests on two different premises about the utility of nuclear weapons in international 
security. If the proliferating state views the aggregation of nuclear weapons as offering no 
strategic advantage because nuclear weapons serve no purpose other than deterrence, then it will 
perceive the aggregation of nuclear weapons to have no effect on the strategic balance in the 
international system. Thus, the proliferating state may be willing to offer nuclear assistance 
because it does not pose a significant threat to its own security. On the other hand, if the 
proliferating state perceives the spread of nuclear weapons as an effective way to create an 
asymmetric balance of power against an adversary by serving as a form of a credible threat, then 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 The underlying logic of coercive diplomacy is that a state can generate costs sufficient and credible enough 
to convince an adversary to alter its behavior without resorting to brute military force. For a discussion on 
coercive diplomacy, see Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace 
Press, 1991). 
11 Ibid, 157. 
 13 
it is more likely to offer nuclear assistance. In this perspective, building up another state’s or an 
ally’s nuclear capabilities through the act of nuclear assistance can increase the nuclear assister’s 
security and help signal credible threats to an adversary.  
The relative balance of power approach offers some useful insight to understanding why 
the nuclear assister is often a great power, such as the U.S. However, his two theories offer two 
contrasting and extreme expectations of a state’s nuclear assistance behavior, raising questions 
about the specific conditions that would generate the differing outcomes. The first theory 
suggests that since nuclear weapons constrain a state’s conventional military power and alter the 
existing strategic balance of the international system, a state should always remain completely 
opposed to nuclear assistance. On the other hand, if a state was relatively more powerful than the 
nuclear assistance recipient, and the spread of nuclear weapons is perceived to send a credible 
threat to an adversary, then a nuclear weapons state should offer nuclear assistance to every 
single ally or strategic partner. Therefore, while the relative balance of power theories provides a 
good starting point to examine a country’s overall nonproliferation stance, it provides little 
insight into the conditions that would cause a state to either offer or not offer assistance.  
 
 
1.2 Threat Level in the International System 
 
A second set of literature focuses on the level of a security threat in the international 
environment that shape the costs and incentives of providing and receiving nuclear assistance. In 
“The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation,” Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs argues 
that the likelihood of a state offering nuclear assistance is determined by the existing security 
environment because the anarchic nature of the international system will pressure a state to 
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balance against the nuclear capabilities of a rival state.12  Their research provides a more nuanced 
perspective that has been largely absent by including the variables of the proliferating state and 
its adversaries. Monteiro and Debs argue that since the development of nuclear weapons can 
alter the timing, intensity, consequences of a conflict, and a state’s diplomatic influence, one 
must consider these critical factors that influence the likelihood of nuclear proliferation. They 
argue that states are more likely to proliferate if it faces a high-level security threat. Monteiro 
and Debs define security threat as the “likelihood of future conflict between a country and its 
adversaries.”13 In this perspective, the security benefit of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is 
perceived to outweigh the costs of a nuclear program by increasing a state’s relative power 
against its adversary. Conversely, a benign or improved security environment would lower the 
benefit of nuclear proliferation and undermine a state’s willingness to proliferate.14 Kroenig 
builds on Monteiro and Deb’s logic by arguing that states will be more likely to provide sensitive 
nuclear assistance to states with which they share a common enemy.15 By providing nuclear 
assistance to other states, the nuclear supplier can impose strategic costs on adversaries.  
A limitation of their theory is explaining the relationship between the “level of threat” 
variable in the international system and a state’s decision to pursue internal vs. external 
balancing of nuclear capabilities through nuclear assistance. Internal balancing refers to efforts to 
enhance state's power by increasing one's economic resources and military strength to be able to 
rely on independent capabilities to counter an adversary and compete more effectively in the 
international system.16 In contrast, external balancing is defined as strengthening one's alliances 
                                                 
12 Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs, “The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation” International 
Security 39, no. 2 (2014), 13-17. 
13 Ibid., 12. 
14 Ibid., 14. 
15 Kroenig, “Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance,” 127. 
16 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Theory of International Relations" (Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1979), 168. 
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and interstate defense cooperation and capabilities in order to counter an adversary.17 However, 
it is unclear when a state would pursue a strategy of external balancing to bolster its allies’ 
defense capabilities in the nuclear realm. Likewise, this theory suggests that a state faced with a 
low security threat in the international system will be unlikely to provide sensitive nuclear 
assistance to a state. Since Monteiro and Debs do not clearly define “low security threat,” further 
research is required to determine the severity of a threat that would prompt a state to offer 
nuclear assistance.  
 
1.3 Alliance Politics  
 
Although the literature on alliance politics has predominately focused on conventional 
weapons and arms trade, it also serves as a potentially useful framework to understanding the 
conditions under which a state may offer nuclear assistance. Here, the term “alliance” refers to a 
“formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign 
states.18 Since the beginning of the Cold War, numerous scholars have asserted that alliances 
have enabled the U.S. to prevent arms races and reassure its strategic partners that the U.S. will 
defend them in a military crisis that involves a shared adversary. Consequently, America’s allies 
face little incentives to acquire their own nuclear weapons. However, a significant gap in the 
alliance politics literature is the condition under which a state would be willing to offer nuclear 
assistance to an ally. For example, if two states have a solid and close relationship within an 
alliance, one could argue that it is likely they would cooperate on security issues in general and 
                                                 
Scholars argue that in a self-help, anarchic system, mechanisms of internal balancing are believed to be more 
reliable and precise than external balancing. 
17 Ibid., 169. 
18 Stephen Walt, Origins of Alliance, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). 90. 
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thus be willing offer nuclear assistance to an ally. This significant gap in the alliance politics 
theory suggest the need for further analysis and research. 
 
 
1.4.  Economic factors 
 
Several nuclear politics theorists stress the impact of a state’s level of economic 
development and openness to the international economy as key to understanding the causes of 
nuclear assistance. For example, Sheena Chestnut argues that states will export sensitive nuclear 
materials and technology and ignore the security risks in a desperate search for hard currency.19 
Less developed countries may face strong incentives to proliferate to improve their current 
economic situation. Jabko and Weber include another perspective in this economic literature, 
stating that states that are more open to the international economy will be more likely to provide 
sensitive nuclear assistance. They argue that a state dependent on a particular trading partner 
may be more likely to provide nuclear assistance to that state to avoid undermining an important 
trade relationship.20 
While there is considerable merit in their analysis, it is not widely supported by empirical 
evidence and does not appear useful in understanding the driving factors behind the majority of 
states’ willingness to offer nuclear assistance. A problematic and implicit assumption in this 
theory is that the state offering nuclear assistance is categorized as a “rogue” or 
“underdeveloped” state. Such categories neglect the various types states that can fall under the 
                                                 
19 Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit activity and proliferation: North Korean smuggling networks.” International 
Security 32 (2007): 80-111.  
20 Nicholas Jabko and Steven Weber. 1998. "A Certain Idea of Nuclear Weapons: France's Non-Proliferation 
Policies in Theoretical Perspective." Security Studies 8, no. 1 (Fall 1998): 108-50. 
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category of nuclear supplier. For example, the U.S and Soviet Union were not “underdeveloped” 
states, yet they demonstrated a willingness to offer nuclear assistance to its allies and security 
partners during the Cold War.  
 
 
II. The Distinct Features of the U.S.-French Nuclear Assistance Case 
 
 
As the existing literature on nuclear assistance has been limited to explaining nuclear 
assistance to an adversary or unaligned state, they appear inapplicable in explaining why the 
Nixon administration decided to offer nuclear assistance to France. Kroenig’s argument suggests 
that since nuclear weapons constrain U.S. conventional military power and alter the existing 
strategic balance of the international system, the U.S. should not have offered nuclear assistance 
to France in 1969. On the other hand, since the U.S. was relatively more powerful than any other 
European state and the spread of nuclear weapons could have sent a credible threat to the Soviet 
Union, the U.S. should’ve offered assistance to every single Western European ally. However, 
neither of these outcomes is reflected in the U.S.-French case of nuclear cooperation. Under the 
Nixon administration, the U.S. decided to only offer nuclear assistance to France and was 
opposed to other European states, such as West Germany, from developing an autonomous 
nuclear force separate from NATO.  
The level of threat in the international system, and alliance politics, initially appear as 
plausible explanations but are also not sufficient factors to explain the Nixon’s administration 
nuclear policy decision towards France. The problem with this approach is that it expects either 
too little or too much nuclear assistance. For example, why did the U.S. decide to only offer 
nuclear assistance to France and not to other states? If the Soviet Union was perceived as a high 
security threat to both the U.S. and France, it remains unclear why the U.S. helped France bolster 
 18 
its autonomous nuclear force instead of internally balancing NATO’s nuclear capabilities to 
strengthen its extended deterrence?  On the other hand, one could argue that the Soviet Union 
was a low threat in the late 1960s, as President Nixon and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev 
were engaged with SALT negotiations. However, if the Soviet Union was perceived as a low 
security threat at this time, then U.S. officials should have faced no incentives to offer nuclear 
assistance to France. These contrasting observations suggest that nuclear assistance to an ally is a 
distinct case whose dynamics cannot be sufficiently captured by the theories noted above.  
Scholars have yet to offer an analytical approach that is best able to explain the 
conditions under which a state may be willing to offer nuclear assistance to an ally. Rather than 
asserting that the existing theories outline above are incorrect or irrelevant, I argue that we need 
to develop a new and specific set of theories to understand why U.S. officials were willing 
nuclear assistance to the French in 1969. America’s nuclear assistance to France represents a 
distinct empirical case. The nuclear supplier is a great power (the United States), and the 
recipient is a major power ally (France) and not a peripheral actor. Based on this empirical case’s 
unique conditions, I propose that scholars should examine the question of nuclear assistance to 
an ally through a different analytical approach. One approach is to consider how the strength of 
an alliance may influence a state’s willingness to offer nuclear assistance. According to the 
traditional theories of alliance politics, states are more likely to cooperate in general as the 
strength of an alliance increases. Conversely, the breakdown of an alliance would result in 
greater mistrust and less cooperation between two states. Thus, we could imagine a state offering 
nuclear assistance when alliance relations are strong and opposing nuclear assistance when 
alliance relations are weak. Another plausible approach is to consider how norms against nuclear 
proliferation may influence a state’s willingness to offer nuclear assistance to an ally. For 
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example, the ratification of the NPT in 1968 helped serve as the foundation for a near-universal 
nuclear nonproliferation regime. As argued by Martha Finnemore, international institutions and 
norms are able to constrain a state’s power by increasing reputational costs. Therefore, we could 
hypothesize that the relative strength of a nuclear nonproliferation norms in the international 
system may determine a state’s willingness to offer nuclear assistance to an ally.  
 
III. Political Opportunism in Bilateral Relations 
 
I aim to address the puzzle of America’s nuclear assistance to France through a broader 
lens by contextualizing the Nixon administration’s decision in comparison to previous 
administrations. While scholars have often characterized the U.S.-French nuclear assistance 
program in 1969 as shocking and unprecedented, it is critical to note that the question of nuclear 
assistance to France did emerge in earlier periods. As I will demonstrate in chapter two, U.S. 
government officials in the Eisenhower and Kennedy administration considered and were even 
willing at times offering nuclear assistance to France. Additionally, existing theories have sought 
to explain nuclear assistance by focusing solely on the state’s capabilities. This emphasis on the 
state’s attributes implicitly suggests that a state’s decision to offer nuclear assistance is straight-
forward and deterministic. Yet America’s decision of whether or not to offer nuclear aid to 
France was not linear or predictable, and included instances where policymakers were willing 
but ultimately did not offer nuclear assistance to France. Examining earlier periods of U.S.-
French nuclear relations can provide important insight to the significance of the Nixon 
administration’s decision, as well as the gap between the U.S. willingness and U.S. decision to 
offer France nuclear assistance across the different administrations.  
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By incorporating this broader context, this thesis argues that Nixon officials formulated 
the U.S. nuclear assistance policy to France in response to particular opportunities and incentives 
that were more connected to bilateral relations with France. In comparison to his predecessors, 
President Nixon appears as the least likely candidate that would provide France nuclear 
assistance, given the weakened state of NATO relations, détente, and U.S. commitment to the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime during his administration. Yet during periods of a relatively high 
Soviet threat and strong NATO alliance relations, the U.S. did not offer nuclear assistance to 
France. Although President Eisenhower and Kennedy demonstrated a willingness to offer 
nuclear assistance to France, it was only under the Nixon administration that U.S. officials 
implemented such policy. The political opportunism approach offers a compelling explanation 
that accounts for both the perplexing timing and decision that grand theories related to the threat 
or normative environment cannot sufficiently capture.  
 
IV. Methodology and Hypotheses 
 
Drawing on the analytical approach outlined above, I will test this theory of political 
opportunism in influencing policy outcomes alongside the possible competing explanations for 
the dependent variable, the U.S. decision to offer France nuclear assistance. I measure the 
variable “nuclear assistance” by examining policies, agreements and memos that reveal when 
U.S. officials implemented a policy of nuclear assistance. I will test the following hypotheses: 
 
• H1: The U.S. decision to offer nuclear assistance to France was due to the relative 
strength of nuclear nonproliferation norms 
 
 21 
• H2: The U.S. decision to offer nuclear assistance to France was due to a shift in the level 
of threat that the Soviet Union posed to U.S. and Western European security  
 
• H3: The U.S. decision to offer nuclear assistance to France was due to the relative 
strength of the NATO alliance 
 
• H4: The U.S. decision to offer nuclear assistance to France was in response to the 
relative political opportunism within U.S. and France bilateral relations. 
 
Although this thesis is focused on addressing the outcome of nuclear assistance, I also 
examine whether U.S. officials across each administration considered offering nuclear aid to 
France, and if so, how they attempted to shape the character of the assistance. An exploration 
and consideration of U.S. policymakers’ attitudes and willingness can shed some light on the 
timing, sequence, and significance of this policy decision. 
 
According to theories of nuclear nonproliferation, as the norm against nuclear 
proliferation strengthens over time, this should reduce a country’s incentive to offer nuclear 
assistance to another state because the reputational costs increase. Under H1, we would find 
evidence that the U.S. offered nuclear aid to France before the NPT, due to the permissive 
international environment characterized by weak norms against nuclear proliferation. We would 
expect President Eisenhower and Kennedy to consider and offer nuclear assistance to France. 
After the implementation of the NPT in 1968, the U.S. should not have offered nuclear assistance 




If nuclear assistance is directly correlated with level of threat in the international system, 
the U.S. would have offered nuclear assistance to France in response to the level of the Soviet 
threat (H2). We would expect that as the Soviet threat increases and nuclear deterrence appears 
to be weakened, U.S. officials would pursue nuclear assistance as a way to strengthen its nuclear 
deterrence. Thus, as Soviet conventional and nuclear parity in the early 1960s challenges 
America’s extended deterrence commitments to its allies, the assumption is that U.S. 
policymakers offered nuclear assistance to France as a way to create independent nuclear forces 
in Western Europe. As scholars have noted that U.S. and Soviet Union reached nuclear parity by 
the Cuban missile crisis, we would expect the U.S. to not offer nuclear assistance until after 
1963.21 However, the easing of tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations by 1969 would decrease the 
level of the Soviet threat and lead the U.S. not to offer nuclear assistance.  
 
Under H3, we should expect nuclear assistance to be offered to France in response to 
perceived strengths or weaknesses in the NATO alliance. Nuclear assistance should be offered 
when transatlantic relations were strong and U.S. and European policymakers had favorable 
attitudes towards NATO institutions. During periods of transatlantic tensions and institutional 
strife within NATO, we would expect the U.S. to not offer nuclear assistance. Within the context 
of U.S.-French nuclear relations, nuclear assistance should thus exist prior to 1960, when France 
was still integrated in NATO’s military command and before the Vietnam War introduced 
significant tensions in the NATO relationship. 
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Under H4, U.S. nuclear assistance to France would be formulated in response to 
particular political opportunities and incentives that were connected more to bilateral relations 
with France at the time. Instead of justifying nuclear assistance in terms of U.S. strategic security 
advantages, the U.S. would consider and frame the assistance program within U.S.-French 
relations. In this logic, stronger U.S.-French ties would have positive spillover effects to other 
diplomatic and security issues that the U.S. were concerned with. We should find evidence that 
earlier administrations debated and considered offering nuclear assistance to France but faced 
domestic and international constraints to implement such policies (i.e.: De Gaulle’s 
administration, concerns of West Germany rearmament). In contrast, we would expect the Nixon 
administration to prioritize U.S.-French relations over both U.S.-NATO relations and U.S.-
bilateral relations with other Western European countries (i.e.: Germany and U.K.). This would 
be reflected in the frequency of the content relating to France discussed within internal and 
diplomatic meetings, as well as the number of meetings between U.S.-French officials compared 
to the meetings held with officials from other Western European states. In particular, we would 
expect Nixon to reference nuclear assistance to other broad geopolitical considerations prior to 
the start, and throughout, the duration of the nuclear assistance program, such as future 
integration and cooperation on military and economic issues between the U.S. and France.   
To test these hypotheses, I conduct process-tracing to reconstruct the historical narrative 
and track the development of the Nixon administration’s foreign policy making decision process. 
I draw on private documents, memorandums, meeting notes, and reports from the National 
Security Archive, Richard Nixon Presidential Library, and the Foreign Relations of the United 
States (FRUS) series, to trace the Nixon administration’s decision to offer nuclear assistance. I 
will also consult Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s memoirs to gain some 
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perspective and assess how their perception of the risks of nuclear proliferation and assessment 
of U.S. and Soviet power may have influenced their policy decision. I also relied primarily on 
recently declassified documents compiled by William Burr from the Wilson Center to explore 
how the Nixon administration carried out its strategy of “negative guidance” with the French 
Defense Ministry. There are two significant limitations to my research. Some of these documents 
related to this case remain classified or have critical texts sanitized, so I am unable to capture the 
entirety of the Nixon administration’s decision-making process and calculation. In addition, I am 
unable to provide the French perspective of this case because existing French archival laws have 
severely restricted access to records on nuclear weapons matters. Thus, this thesis does not claim 
to provide a comprehensive account of the U.S.-French nuclear assistance program, a task that 
remains impossible until more documents are released. However, since my thesis attempts to 
explore the factors driving U.S. policymakers’ decision to offer nuclear assistance to France, I 
am still able to deduce some broad conclusions by contextualizing the case beyond the Nixon 
administration.  
Using these archival source materials, I analyze the broad shifts and debates in U.S. 
nuclear policy towards France in the following sections. The first chapter sets up this specific 
case study by reviewing the history of U.S. nuclear policy towards the French arsenal under the 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administration. Although the U.S. consistently preferred a 
defense strategy whereby the U.S. provided the “nuclear umbrella” and allies supply the 
“conventional forces,” I demonstrate that debates and consideration towards nuclear assistance to 
France varied over time and in intensity. The following chapter focuses on the Nixon 
administration’s decision-making process to offer nuclear aid to France. In particular, this 
chapter seeks to trace the character and timing of the nuclear assistance program. I focus on the 
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internal debates and discussions within the Department of Defense, National Security Council 
(NSC) members, President Nixon, and Secretary Kissinger’s over time regarding support for the 
French nuclear program. This allows me to assess whether predicted dynamics of alliance 
politics, the level of Soviet threat, nuclear nonproliferation norms, or bi-lateral concerns 
influenced policymaker’s decision across all four administrations. I also assess whether the 
French nuclear debate was framed in terms of NATO or U.S.-French bilateral relation concerns. 
The final chapter concludes with implications for theories of nuclear assistance, and questions 

























Chapter II: Dealing with the “Fourth Country Problem”: Patterns of U.S. 
Nuclear Assistance Policies Towards France, 1953-1968 
 
 
France’s pursuit of an independent nuclear weapons program began over two decades 
before the formation of an international nonproliferation regime, and the development of U.S. 
nonproliferation sanctions policies.22 After World War II, France launched its own nuclear 
program that was initially oriented towards peaceful and civilian use through an atomic energy 
agency, the Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique (CEA), but had a “clear capacity for military 
application.”23 Similar to the British, France perceived an independent nuclear force as a 
“complement to, rather than a substitute for” the U.S. strategic deterrent.24 In the 1950s, the rapid 
emergence of the Soviet threat and fears of a nuclear-armed West Germany prompted the French 
Assembly began to conduct studies on the costs of a French nuclear capability and authorized the 
construction of a plutonium reprocessing facility.25 To support its efforts for the development of 
an independent military nuclear weapons program, the French parliament voted against the 
ratification of the European Defense Community (EDC) treaty in 1954, which prohibited 
member states from using fissile material for military purposes.26 Scholars have noted and 
argued that France’s incentives for nuclear weapons were a mixture of political and military 
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factors. French president Charles De Gaulle justified France’s pursuit of becoming the world’s 
fourth nuclear power by asserting “American nuclear power does not necessarily and 
immediately meet all the eventualities concerning France.”27 From the French government’s 
perspective, the U.S. failure to intervene and aid France in Dien Bien Phu and the Suez crisis 
suggested that there were limits to the circumstances under which the U.S. would protect France 
raised questions about U.S. security guarantee to its allies. This reinforced the need for a French 
nuclear arsenal that was independent of the U.S.-led defense structure.28 Aside from national 
security concerns, French military officials also expressed that becoming the next nuclear power 
was the means to bolster France’s prestige and international status after French defeat in 
Indochina and loss of its overseas colonies. France’s exclusion from the special nuclear 
relationship between Great Britain and the U.S. in the mid-1950s also increased the strength of 
French arguments for diminishing their country's reliance on the U.S. 29 By 1958, Prime Minister 
Guy Mollet directed the CEA to prepare for the militarization of France’s nuclear capability. 
After France successfully carried out its first nuclear test in the Algerian Sahara Dessert in 1960, 
the French government proceeded to ignore international demands related to halting nuclear tests 
and implemented a five-year nuclear plan.30  
Although scholars have argued that Nixon’s decision to provide nuclear assistance to 
France reflected a dramatic shift in U.S. policy, an examination of U.S.-French nuclear 
assistance policy in earlier periods suggests that such notion is more complicated and nuanced.  
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Between 1955 to 1968, U.S. policymakers did not penalize or attempt to apply coercive 
pressure on Paris to abandon its nuclear ambitions. 31 Rather, U.S. officials entertained the idea 
of engaging in nuclear assistance with France and adopted a policy of ambivalence towards the 
French nuclear program. This chapter seeks to briefly outline U.S. nuclear assistance policies 
towards France’s arsenal across three different presidential administrations: Dwight D. 
Eisenhower (1953-1961), John F. Kennedy (1961-1963), and Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969). 
Each subsection examines each president’s perspective on NATO, nuclear nonproliferation, and 
the role nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy to contextualize U.S-French nuclear assistance 
policies. As my thesis concentrates on exploring the shift in the U.S. nuclear assistance policy to 
France during the Nixon administration, this chapter does not attempt to provide an in-depth 
history of U.S.-French nuclear relations across three decades. However, by tracing the history of 
U.S. nuclear policies to France, I utilize this context to demonstrate the significance and 
distinctiveness of Nixon’s decision to offer nuclear assistance to France. 
 
 
I. U.S.–France Nuclear Relations: A Postage Stamp History  
 
i. President Eisenhower: Contending with France’s emerging nuclear power status  
Scholars have characterized U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy during the Eisenhower 
administration as “facilitating proliferation,” in which the U.S. passed policies that either 
“contributed to a state’s existing nuclear weapons capabilities, or increased the ability of a state 
to have independent control over nuclear weapons.”32 Although official U.S policy in the 
immediate post-WWII was opposed horizontal nuclear proliferation, concerns about 
                                                 
31 Miller, Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy, 150. 
32 Nick Miller, “Hegemony and Nuclear Proliferation,” (Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
2014), 18. 
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nonproliferation only received “sustained attention from U.S. security planners in the early 
1960s.”33 The intelligence estimates produced during the Eisenhower administration reflected 
optimistic views of proliferation. For example, the 1957 National Intelligence Estimate 
concluded that only France, Sweden, and Canada had the capability to build nuclear weapons in 
the near future and that “no individual fourth country will be able within the next 10 years to 
develop more than a limited nuclear capability.”34 In this perspective, U.S. policymakers 
expected the geopolitical effects of nuclear weapons to be modest.  
Against the backdrop of the growing Soviet threat, the Eisenhower administration 
implemented a national security policy known as “New Look,” which emphasized balancing 
U.S. security threats with the nation’s financial resources by relying on strategic nuclear forces to 
deter both conventional and nuclear threats from the Soviet Union.35 As noted by historian Marc 
Trachtenberg, the U.S. military was “over extended” and the Eisenhower administration believed 
America’s European allies should have a nuclear capability of their own.36 Thus, NATO played a 
key role in the Atlantic alliance defense strategy against the Soviets, and the U.S. Defense and 
State Department proposed that NATO allies should be trained in, and have access to, the use of 
nuclear weapons in the event of a crisis.37 President Eisenhower supported the notion that U.S. 
allies in Europe should obtain access to nuclear weapons, either those deployed or designed by 
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the U.S. because it could provide them with low-cost ways of obtaining security in the midst of 
the growing Soviet arsenal while also help facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from 
Europe. 38  
The Eisenhower administration perceived a strong NATO as the most effective 
instrument in deterring the Soviets, but such integration efforts would require the U.S. to 
subordinate nonproliferation concerns to strengthening the security alliance. While Eisenhower’s 
1953 “Atoms for Peace” initiative was aimed at promoting an international focus on the potential 
peaceful uses of atomic energy, the diffusion of nuclear technology risked the global spread of 
nuclear weapons capabilities. As Sokolski notes, the Atoms for Peace program actually “made 
the acquisition of such [nuclear] capabilities more likely.”39 Thus, his administration pursued and 
implemented nuclear policies that strove to maintain allied cohesion within a framework of 
limited nuclear sharing. U.S. divergent nuclear policies at this time towards the British and 
French arsenal directly reflect this attempt at selective proliferation. For the British, Eisenhower 
officials concluded that an Anglo-Saxon nuclear hegemony would best protect U.S. security 
interests. According to Baum, Eisenhower and his advisors believed that by increasing nuclear 
cooperation between the U.S. and Britain, all other states would be deterred from attempting to 
develop their own nuclear arsenals.40 In particular, officials believed that it was in U.S. interests 
to have a closer relationship with Britain because it would strengthen NATO.41 Thus, Congress 
modified the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 to enable the U.S. government to share substantial 
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nuclear information and materials to aid Britain’s construction of nuclear submarines. These 
amendments helped strengthen the British nuclear arsenal, and Britain became a junior partner in 
managing NATO’s nuclear arsenal.42 
 The Eisenhower administration appeared to have similar optimistic attitudes towards 
providing assistance for the development of France’s nuclear program. Consistent with the 
administration’s overall nuclear strategy, the Eisenhower administration initially did not seek to 
limit France’s access to nuclear weapons. In the early to mid-1950s, U.S. nuclear support to 
France were offered in two limited forms. The U.S. deployed nuclear bombs on U.S. Air Forces 
Europe (USAFE) tactical aircrafts based in Morocco and France, and also supplied nuclear 
warheads for French forces based in Germany.43 After de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, 
French officials noted to U.S. policymakers that France was still seeking nuclear assistance: 
“France wants at least a few bombs…or at least as much technical information as France could 
get [from the U.S.]”44 This prompted U.S. officials to reconsider U.S. nuclear assistance policy 
towards the French. According to Miller, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Aubrey Quarles 
argued that the U.S. “should make it clear to [de Gaulle] that U.S. policy is not to try to prevent 
the French from developing a nuclear weapons capability.”45 This notion is supported by the fact 
the Dulles informed de Gaulle that the U.S. could potentially offer nuclear assistance to France 
under the recent amendments to the Atomic Energy Act if France also made “substantial 
progress in developing atomic weapons” and could “prove herself a strong and stable ally.”46 
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Given that Congress had not authorized U.S. aid to France, Dulles proposed to de Gaulle that the 
U.S. could “train French forces in the use and delivery of nuclear weapons” and help them 
“develop nuclear-propelled submarines.”47  
However, America’s proposals did not satisfy France’s desire for its own autonomous 
nuclear weapons. De Gaulle welcomed the prospect of receiving U.S. nuclear weapons, but 
believed that acquiring an independent nuclear arsenal would “enable France to meet her 
commitments in the Atlantic alliance.”48 His desire to elevate France’s role in the Atlantic 
alliance led him to propose to a “directorie a trois,” a tripartite organization consisting of the 
U.S., Britain, and France that would make joint decisions on nuclear developments. De Gaulle 
felt that the U.S. had “unfairly penalized an ally” and placed France in a “permanent political, 
military, and technological inferiority in the councils of the great powers.”49 Through this 
tripartite organization, France would obtain an equal veto power as Britain and the U.S. over the 
use of nuclear weapons unless one was under attack. However, President Eisenhower rejected de 
Gaulle’s proposal, noting that U.S. assistance to the development of a “third NATO [nuclear] 
power capable of independent action” would not be authorized by Congress and could have a 
“decisive effect upon other members of [the] alliance” such as West Germany.50  
In fact, when U.S. policymakers failed to offer nuclear assistance to the French through 
the Atomic Energy Act, it attempted to convince France to renounce its ambitions for an 
independent arsenal by rejecting de Gaulle’s tripartite organization offer and instead proposing a 
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sea-based Multilateral Force (MLF) for NATO, where European allies would have joint control 
over an integrated nuclear force, in 1958.51 The MLF would allow for “an independent and 
ultimately purely European nuclear force, whose use would not be subject to an American 
veto.”52 However, such plans were hindered when de Gaulle turned down the U.S. offer and 
proceeded to build its own nuclear device. President Eisenhower’s final attempt to permit nuclear 
assistance with France faced staunch Congressional opposition in 1960.53 
In sum, although Eisenhower signaled a willingness to aid the French nuclear program on 
several occasions throughout his presidency, a hostile de Gaulle administration government and 
U.S. Congress prevented his administration from offering France the technical nuclear assistance 
that it granted to Britain. 
 
ii. President Kennedy: Schizophrenic Attitudes Towards the French Nuclear Arsenal 
 
In contrast to Eisenhower, President John F. Kennedy entered office in 1961 with a firm 
policy of nuclear nonproliferation, and did not favor trading nuclear knowledge in exchange for 
political or economic benefits.54 Kennedy warned that “the possibility in the 1970s of the 
President of the United States having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have 
these weapons…is the greatest possible danger and hazard.”55 U.S. nonproliferation policy 
towards adversary and nonaligned states during the Kennedy administration can be characterized 
as “impeding proliferation,” where U.S. policymakers attempted to “restrict the global spread of 
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sensitive nuclear technologies or to reduce the ability of states to gain independent control of 
nuclear weapons.”56 This public commitment towards reducing the possibility of additional 
nuclear-armed states in the international system is reflected the various nuclear policies and 
agreements that the Kennedy administration proposed and passed. For example, the U.S. and 
USSR ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in 1963, which prohibited all nuclear tests 
except for those underground. This international treaty was intended to prevent additional states 
from acquiring nuclear weapons. 
The Kennedy administration replaced Eisenhower’s military strategy of “massive 
retaliation” with “flexible response,” a strategy that emphasized reliance on conventional 
capabilities instead of nuclear weapons to allow the U.S. to develop several options to respond to 
any form of military crisis in Europe.57 Kennedy pulled back Eisenhower’s policies that had 
granted Europeans control over American nuclear weapons, ordering that “National nuclear 
forces were to be avoided and control was to be concentrated in American hands.”58 Moreover, 
the Kennedy administration modified the proposed MLF plan. Instead of functioning as a 
precursor to an independent European nuclear force, the MLF would have a firm American veto 
and was aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation to West Germany.59  
As U.S. officials reformed the MLF plan, Paris continued to seek U.S. nuclear assistance 
to save time and money. At this time, France had already staged its first nuclear test. However, 
the Kennedy administration publicly presented itself against offering any form of nuclear aid, 
arguing that it would jeopardize U.S. interests in Europe and NATO. From a strategic defense 
perspective, some U.S. government officials argued that there was little value in having 
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independent, European nuclear forces outside of NATO, as the U.S. continued to offer nuclear 
warhead support to French in West Germany.60 Defense Secretary Robert McNamara asserted 
that “Relatively weak national nuclear forces are not likely to be sufficient to perform even the 
function of deterrence.”61 At a NATO Ministerial meeting in Athens, McNamara argued that 
such independent nuclear forces were dangerous and unnecessary costs because it encouraged 
the proliferation of other nuclear powers.62 In addition to such security risks, other officials 
expressed concerns regarding the political implications of initiating a nuclear assistance program 
with the French. Undersecretary George Ball expressed that France was already challenging U.S. 
hegemony in Europe, and a U.S.-led nuclear collaboration with the French could inspire West 
Germany to seek its own arsenal.63  
Despite U.S.-French tensions and Kennedy’s public stance towards nuclear 
nonproliferation, he later reversed Acheson’s policy recommendations and proposed the U.S. to 
consider aiding France’s nuclear capabilities. What can explain this sudden turnaround in U.S. 
nuclear policy? As historian Francis Gavin critically notes, Kennedy officials’ rhetoric did not 
reflect the administration real strategic views on the issue of nuclear sharing. While officials 
applied its policy of nuclear nonproliferation towards other states, they separated the French 
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question from nonproliferation concerns. Between 1962 to 1963, nuclear sharing remained an 
open question, and the U.S. did not actively oppose France’s nuclear development and were even 
in the process of opening up negotiations.64 During the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962, Kennedy 
offered nuclear assistance to France. U.S. Ambassador to France James Gavin advocated for 
expanding U.S. bilateral nuclear relationship because it may give the U.S. “the same element of 
control that our cooperation with the British has given.”65 At the Nassau Conference in 
December 1962, Kennedy also extended to France Polaris missiles under the same status and 
condition as Britain.66 In January 1963, Secretary Rusk instructed the U.S. ambassador to France 
Charles Bohlen to “impress on the French that the decision to offer them the Nassau proposals 
represents a major turning point in United States policy. It implies a willingness to recognize 
France as a nuclear power and to bring substantially to an end the exclusive quality of the U.S.-
U.K. relationship.”67 By the summer of 1963, the Kennedy administration was even ready to give 
the French “Polaris or Minutemen missiles…Polaris submarine technology,” and even “nuclear 
warheads for their bombs” under the condition that France signed the Limited Test Ban.68 De 
Gaulle did not accept this offer, but Kennedy’s personal offer to France suggests that U.S. 
attitudes towards nuclear assistance was not influenced by concerns regarding the Soviet threat.  
In sum, an examination of U.S. policies towards France’s nuclear weapons program in 
the mid-1960s reveals that the Kennedy administration adopted a policy of selective proliferation 
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when it came America’s European allies. Similar to Eisenhower administration, Kennedy 
officials entertained with, and debated, the idea of assisting an independent French nuclear force. 
While the Kennedy administration publicly adopted a rhetoric of “flexible response,” officials 
privately demonstrated a willingness to aid an independent French nuclear force.  
 
 
iii. President Johnson: Denial and Diversion 
 
When President Johnson entered office in 1964, he initially remained ambivalent toward 
towards the risks of nuclear nonproliferation for both adversary and allied states. Washington 
was willing to maintain its “special relationship” with the U.K. and maintained its support for the 
MLF. There is a significant gap in the literature pertaining to the Johnson administration’s 
attitudes debates towards assisting the French nuclear arsenal, but the administration inherited 
Kennedy’s nuclear policies towards the French and remained committed to the MLF plan.69 
However, after the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) conducted its first atomic test in 1964,  
U.S. nuclear policies reverted to firm nuclear nonproliferation for both adversary and allied 
states. For the French, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy maintained that the U.S. 
should not exchange any information, research activities, or sell equipment that would assist in 
the development of France’s nuclear capabilities.70 The Johnson White House formalized U.S. 
opposition in the National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 294, which asserted that the 
U.S. would not engage in significant assistance affecting timing, quality or cost of the French 
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nuclear program as long as the French strategic nuclear weapons are not committed to NATO.71 
In sum, the U.S. was now opposed to the development of nuclear forces by other states except 
those approved by NATO. U.S-French relations became more tense and difficult, reaching its 
lowest point in 1966 when de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO's military structure. 
Following France’s withdrawal, the U.S. suspended the 1961 Agreement and all forms of nuclear 
weapons support to France was halted.72 Most notably, the Johnson administration scrapped the 
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Table 1: Summary of U.S. attitudes and policies towards nuclear assistance to France, 1953-1968 
 
Existing theories suggest that due to the risks of nuclear proliferation, the U.S. should 
have halted nuclear assistance to France at the onset. Yet throughout the 1950s to 1960s, France 
successfully expanded and improved its nuclear capabilities in the midst of relatively little 
American opposition. During these two decades, it was not obvious to U.S. officials that 
proliferation was inimical to U.S. interests.73 By tracing the history of U.S.-French nuclear 
assistance policies prior to the Nixon administration, this chapter challenges the common notion 
that the Nixon’s decision to offer nuclear assistance to France in 1970 reflected a dramatic shift 
in U.S. nuclear policy. A consistent and notable trend observed across the three administrations 
is that the question of whether to aid the French nuclear weapons program was much more 
frequently discussed than the question of whether to use coercion to stop the French’s nuclear 
ambitions. Although the U.S. actively sought to prevent West Germany from acquiring nuclear 
weapons and was concerned whether the Soviets would perceive nuclear assistance as a 
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contradiction to U.S. commitment to non-proliferation, top decision-makers did not assert that a 
strong opposition policy was necessary or even desired. Another critical observation is that U.S. 
officials’ reactions to France’s nuclear development and assistance requests deviate from our 
existing theories’ expectations. Despite shifts in the Soviet threat and changes in the strength of 
the NATO alliance, each administration demonstrated a willingness to offer France nuclear 
assistance. However, President Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson fell short of implementing 
such policy, suggesting the need to explore the factors that could explain the perplexing gap 
between the U.S.’ willingness vs. policy outcome. The following chapter turns to the Nixon 

























Chapter III: The Start of Something New? Nixon’s Approach towards France 
 
 
When President Richard Nixon entered office in 1969, he inherited a weakening U.S.-
European relationship and a NATO that appeared increasingly obsolete and in disarray. After the 
failure of Western European leaders to coordinate a response to the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in August 1968, U.S. and European policymakers questioned whether NATO 
would be renewed beyond its twenty-year deadline, which was set to expire in April 1969.74 For 
five years, America’s ongoing war in Vietnam was at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. Nixon 
thus “wanted to show the world that the new American President was not completely obsessed 
with Vietnam… [and] that, despite opposition to the war, their President could still be received 
abroad with respect and even enthusiasm.”75 Thus, transatlantic relations were one of the key 
foreign policy areas that were personally handled by Nixon and Kissinger, and U.S. officials 
hoped to usher in a period of “imaginative updating and refurbishing of the NATO Alliance.”76 
This emphasis on a “rebalance” towards Europe was clearly reflected in Nixon’s public 
statement on February 6, 1969, where he formally announced that his first overseas would be to 
Western Europe. Nixon hoped his visit would demonstrate U.S. commitment to its European 
allies, and foster closer transatlantic ties: “The Alliance, held together in its first two decades by 
a common fear, needs now the sense of cohesiveness supplied by common purpose. I am eager 
for an early exchange of views on all the important issues that concern us.”77  
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While the Nixon administration had to grapple with a plethora of transatlantic issues, one 
of the centerpieces of his foreign policies was the normalization of U.S.-French security and 
defense relations. This chapter examines how it was that, under the Nixon administration, the 
U.S. nuclear assistance policy towards France shifted from ambiguity to support. As outlined in 
the previous chapter, with the exception of President Johnson, Nixon’s predecessors were 
relatively ambivalent about the risks of nuclear proliferation and showed signs of willingness to 
accept the possibility of selective nuclear assistance to France. However, Nixon was the only 
President that formalized America’s interest in helping France possess a more effective nuclear 
force. Neither the state of international politics or specific changes in U.S.-NATO relations can 
fully explain this shift in nuclear policy. Despite poor and weakened U.S.-French alliance and 
the assumption that the U.S. would soon enter a phase of détente with the Soviet Union that 
encouraged a decrease in the number of nuclear weapons in the international system, U.S. 
policymakers proactively helped the French improve their nuclear force.  
Using available and declassified primary sources, I lay out the evolution of U.S.-French 
discussions and debates pertaining to cooperation on military defense, and how the 
administration reached the conclusion that the U.S. would offer nuclear aid through a program 
known as “negative guidance.” Due to the secretive nature of the program, there remain 
significant gaps in how much technical assistance U.S. offered, and the extent of the cooperation. 
President Nixon, Secretary Kissinger, and government officials did not mention of the program 
in their memoirs, and the program was not leaked to the press. The confidentiality and maximum 
security classification is reflected in the small number of senior government officials who were 
aware of this nuclear assistance initiative: President Nixon, Kissinger, Melvin Laird (Secretary of 
Defense), Richard Helms (Director of Central Intelligence), General Earle Wheeler (Chairman of 
 43 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Glenn T. Seaborg (Charmin of the Atomic Energy Commission) and 
Gerard Smith (director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).78 As many of 
the details remain obscured, this chapter does not seek to provide a full or definitive narrative of 
the nuclear collaboration program between Washington and Paris, but rather outline the timeline 
of discussions and the strategic concerns expressed by U.S. policymakers in their decision to aid 
France. I conclude with how the political dilemmas that the Nixon administration faced by 
deciding to initiate a nuclear assistance program, and how it attempted to manage and overcome 
these tensions.  
 




Given the Nixon’s administration desire for a new phase in transatlantic relations, it is 
unsurprising that it pursued a new course of revitalizing and expanding bilateral relations with 
France. National Security Council (NSC) members emphasized that good diplomacy and military 
relations “between France and the United States contribute[d] to the health of the [NATO] 
Alliance” while “poor French-U.S. relations make our tasks more difficult and distress our 
allies.”79 These vague conclusions did not equate to specific policies that outlined how 
administration would conduct defense relations with France. In fact, in contrast to the Johnson 
administration, the Nixon White House did not have a clear or coherent doctrine basis towards 
dealing with the rise of nuclear powers. However, Nixon and Kissinger early on "sought to make 
it clear that they did not oppose the French force,” and “appreciated the contribution it made to 
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Western security."80 At a private meeting at Élysée Palace between Nixon and de Gaulle in 
March 1969, Nixon had already expressed that “it was important for the good of the U.S. that not 
only France should have nuclear weapons but in a broader sense” so that that would be another 
power which “can be a major economic, political, and military force apart from the U.S.”81  
The question and discussion of the possibility U.S. assistance to France’s nuclear 
program under the Nixon administration formally emerged when Kissinger met with British 
Defense Minister Denis Healey to discuss U.S.-French military cooperation in April 1969.82 
Healey noted to Kissinger that there had been press speculation that France would be interested 
in joint nuclear planning with the U.S.83 Although the French had not formally approached any 
U.S. officials about nuclear cooperation, nor had the U.S. proposed any explicit offers at this 
time, Kissinger noted that the U.S. was “reviewing its stance towards European nuclear forces” 
and if the French triggered talks of cooperation, the “U.S. response would be to give them a 
respectful hearing.”84 Any decision to aid France would be heavily weighed beforehand by U.S. 
and U.K. officials.85 However, conversations between Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. and Kissinger reveal 
that the U.S. and U.K. did not share the same approach towards the French nuclear program. The 
U.K. insisted that any form of French nuclear cooperation had to be discussed within the 
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framework of the NATO alliance, and under the conditions that France agreed to be a part of the 
NPG and renter NATO defense.86 In contrast to this position, while the U.S. similarly prioritized 
“preserving the integrity of NATO,” officials did not wish to bind the U.S. to any formal 
commitments without fully assessing its implications to U.S. foreign policy, and would not 
affirm to the U.K. that the U.S. would approach nuclear cooperation with France with the same 
stance.87   
In the midst of de Gaulle’s uncertain political future and possible resignation, Nixon 
requested the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe to conduct a study formulating U.S. 
policy options with respect to military relations with France. From this memorandum (NSSM 
47), it is clear that the Nixon administration was interested in specifically exploring the 
possibility of fostering U.S.-French nuclear cooperation with a focus on how it would impact 
U.S.-alliance relationships, specifically nuclear relations with the U.K. Nixon outlined three 
guidelines for the NSC to consider while developing U.S. policies and options towards post-de 
Gaulle France: developments in France that would require “positive” reaction by the U.S., key 
areas that the U.S. should attempt to influence French foreign policy, and how the sharing of 
nuclear weapons technology information would affect U.S. bilateral relations with France.88  
Despite the Nixon’s assertion that his administration would prioritize strengthening NATO and 
U.S. relations with its allies, notably missing from this memorandum is any consideration or 
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discussions of how U.S. policies towards France would impact U.S. bilateral ties with West 
Germany, the NATO alliance, and U.S. relations with the Soviet Union.  
While the French government rejected rejoining NATO’s defense structure, U.S. 
Ambassador to France Robert Sargent Shriver Jr. shared with Kissinger and NSC senior staff 
member and advisor Henry Sonnenfeldt that the French signaled an interest in entering bilateral 
military talks with the U.S.89 At this point, the Nixon administration does not appear to have 
formulated any decision regarding U.S. nuclear cooperation with France. However, Nixon 
officials’ attitudes appear generally favorable towards exploring potential possibilities for a 
nuclear assistance program. The retirement of De Gaulle, and appointment of Georges Pompidou 
as the new French president, prompted a reassessment of U.S.-French defense relations. The 
administration’s speculation pointed to two factors of why the French was now willing to enter 
into a closer, more cooperative relationship with the U.S. The U.S. sought to de-escalate the war 
in Vietnam, and Washington respected Paris’ “right to disagree” in the “interest of more 
effective cooperation toward common aims.”90 Consequently, the French government was now 
more “open,” and ballistic missile programs was  “an area where we [the U.S.] can further 
cooperate with this country.”91 Although the prospects of nuclear sharing were unclear at this 
point, Kissinger explicitly shared with Shriver that President would not let any 
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“NATO theology” stand in the way of “whatever advantages might accrue to U.S. security” 
through an increase in U.S.-French military cooperation.92 Kissinger also suggested to Shriver 
that Nixon may be interested in developing some cooperation in this nuclear weapons field.93 
With this optimistic outlook, Shriver, Kissinger, and Sonnenfeldt agreed to invite French 
President Pompidou to visit the U.S. in February 1970 to further explore and discuss U.S. 
and NATO cooperation with France.  
 
II. The First French Nuclear Request to the Nixon Administration 
In December 1969, the French Armaments Ministry Jean Blancard formally issued a 
direct request to the Pentagon for technical assistance with developing and improving France’s 
ballistic missile program. The Pentagon noted that the French had four key, broad technical 
interests: reliability, star tracker navigation equipment, re-entry vehicle materials, and U.S. 
contractor support on development of boosters.94  The memo does not provide further details, it 
noted that such technical assistance would help the French improve the reliability and accuracy 
of their missiles. While the U.S. could provide some technical assistance without jeopardizing 
classified and sensitive information that could threaten U.S. security, Director of Defense 
Research and Engineering John S. Foster Jr. argued that greater concern was whether an 
assistance program would jeopardize or contribute to U.S. foreign policy interests. Three of the 
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major political and military implications emphasized in Foster’s memo to Kissinger included 
U.S. obligations under the NPT, the possibility of “strengthening NATO” or U.S. position in 
France, and U.S. Congressional reaction.95 Given these assessments and uncertainties, Kissinger 
requested the Department of Defense to prepare a background study that would review these 
various policy implications, as well as the outline the legal restrictions “concerning the provision 
of various kinds of information or assistance” the U.S. could offer. Kissinger also sent a 
memorandum to President Nixon noting that while Pompidou was unlikely to take any initiative 
to raise military issues during his visit to the U.S., Nixon should attempt to gain a broader sense 
of French strategic thinking towards NATO during their meeting.96 The Department of Defense’s 
assessment, combined with insight into Pompidou’s attitudes, in relation to the French’s nuclear 
request would allow the Nixon administration to consider if the U.S. should foster closer military 
cooperation with France, and if so, pursue policy under the NATO umbrella or in the form of 
bilateral relations. In hopes of granting the administration the most flexibility in formulating 
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policy options, Kissinger recommended Nixon that his discussions with the French should avoid 
the topic of returning France to the military dimension of NATO.97  
Although U.S. policymakers had previously agreed that they would consult British 
officials, efforts to hold talks with the French pertaining to defense issues went forward. 
Pompidou’s visit to Washington in February 1970 served as the framework for the Nixon 
administration’s decision on how to approach the French’s strategic nuclear assistance request. 
Conversations between Nixon and Pompidou reveal that both leaders wanted to re-start U.S.-
French relations and were particularly interested in discussing defense policy. Nixon rejected the 
view that Paris and Washington had irreconcilable differences and called for a "new spirit of 
Franco-American relations."98 Pompidou agreed with Nixon's approach and both leaders 
supported the notion of finding ways to coordinate U.S. and French military policy while 
maintaining each country’s independent positions. While Pompidou did not explicitly ask for any 
type of U.S. nuclear assistance, he emphasized France's weak nuclear capabilities by noting that 
French missiles were unlikely able to reach their targets. He hoped that France would be able to 
overcome its strategic weakness once they had acquired nuclear missile submarines and tactical 
nuclear weapons. Nixon later noted Pompidou that the "nuclear question" could be a subject of 
talks on cooperation.99 Consistent with Kissinger’s demands, Nixon promised Pompidou that the 
U.S. would explore the possibility of nuclear cooperation without the condition of the French 
changing its military position towards NATO. Both leaders agreed that cooperation should move 
forward, and they would review progress on a periodic-basis.100 
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To follow up his meeting with Pompidou and explore what was feasible from a U.S. 
military standpoint, Nixon approved Kissinger’s request for Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR) General Andrew Goodpaster to explore opportunities for greater cooperation with 
the French military, and requested the Pentagon to provide advice on "courses of action and 
difficulties associated with them" that could be taken in the missile assistance area.101 Laird also 
proposed that Foster meet with Armaments Minister Jean Blancard in Paris for exploratory talks 
to help the U.S. gain a deeper understanding of exactly what the French requested. The 
discussions between Foster and Blancard in June 1970 generated a more specific nuclear 
assistance wish-list from the French, who wanted to find ways to "save time and money" in 
developing their land-based intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBMs) and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) for both types of missiles, the French sought information 
from the U.S. on better more reliable solid-fuel engines, and material for re-entry vehicles that 
would be more resistant to nuclear effects, fabrication techniques.102 The French were also 
seeking the U.S. government to lift existing restrictions on the use of powerful and advanced 
U.S. computers, and the import of U.S. computer components, in France’s nuclear program to 
“produce more reliable and effective nuclear weapons.”103 Additionally, the Department of 
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Defense speculated that the French would later ask for “information on improvements…to 
MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle)…Minuteman III and Poseidon.”104 
 
III. Formalizing U.S.-French Nuclear Assistance  
On September 1, 1970, President Nixon issued another National Security Memorandum 
titled “Military Cooperation with France” (NSSM 100) in order to clarify the reasons for U.S. aid 
to France, the various actions that Washington could take, and analysis of political areas of 
potential conflict.105 Between June to September 1970, France’s request sparked ongoing debates 
and discussions among top U.S. officials regarding the advantages and disadvantages of U.S. 
offering aid to France. An examination of the NSSM 100, policy reviews, and internal 
documents between members of the NSC and the Department of Defense, reveal that 
international and domestic concerns, rather than technical security issues, were more contentious 
and dominated discussions. From a technical and security standpoint, Foster noted that 
Washington could not help the French would star-tracker technology because it would grant 
France counterforce capabilities, but guidance on reliability and re-entry materials could be 
explored without compromising systems and “without revealing information which, should it fall 
into Soviet hands, would be major concern to us.”106 Most notably, the Department of Defense 
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concluded that in the U.S. would not gain much from the French “in the technical field, but a 
political return could be considered.”107 
While offering nuclear assistance to France supported President Nixon’s desire to 
improve relations with France, some officials perceived the program potentially threatening other 
U.S. foreign policy objectives and having grave international ramifications. Not surprisingly, the 
least supportive government official of this initiative was the director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and chief U.S. delegate to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT) Gerard C. Smith, who pleaded to Kissinger that “With twenty years of weapon 
cooperation scars on my head… I send along the friendly advice ‘please don't.’"108 The political 
dilemmas linked to the U.S. offering nuclear assistance to France were ones that similarly 
appeared in prior administrations, such as America’s commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime and U.S.-Soviet relations. On the domestic front, officials had to grapple with the 
question of if, and how, nuclear aid could be carried out within the confines of existing legal and 
policy restrictions. As noted earlier, the NSAM 294 restricted the U.S. from offering any 
assistance to France's ballistic missile program.109 Second, the any assistance that required the 
transfer of restricted data on nuclear weapons information required Congress to approve an 
“Agreement for Cooperation.” A formal revocation of the national security memorandum, as 
well as a review of French forces, would likely to provoke Congressional opposition. Overall, 
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officials that had reservations about Franco-American nuclear cooperation argued on the basis 
that such initiative could damage U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, its European allies.  
 
IV. Reconciling Tensions: Nixon’s Program of “Negative Guidance”  
 
U.S. policymakers spent over one year conducting policy reviews of military aid to 
France before agreeing to offer aid under the specific condition of “helping to improve the 
operability and reliability of existing French systems.”110 In March 29, 1971, Nixon approved 
offering “minimal aid,” where the U.S. would assist the French in “non-sensitive” areas such as 
nuclear safety and computer exports but not extend cooperation to all the nuclear fields that the 
French had requested. For example, Washington would redefine “advanced computers” to allow 
some France to gain some access certain computer parts. As the majority of the text on existing 
documents remain sanitized, one is unable to further details regarding what types of technical 
assistance for their ballistic missile program were approved and not approved. However, the 
National Security Memorandum 103 (NSSM) reveals that Washington would not help France 
develop new types of missiles or "provide France with a distinct new capability." The most 
notable aspect of this assistance program was that it was relatively limited at first to improving 
the reliability of the then current generation of French missiles. While offer such proposals was 
undoubtedly controversial within the U.S. government, it was less contentious than proposals for 
aid on nuclear weapons safety procedures. In comparison to U.S.-U.K. nuclear cooperation, 
France would not obtain access to weapons designs.111 
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The U.S.-French nuclear assistance program official began in June 1971. How did the Nixon 
administration attempt to overcome these legal constraints, and appear to continue to uphold the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime without provoking domestic, allied, and Soviet backlash? One 
could argue that the Nixon administration did not need to actively mitigate these political 
tensions because they were able to prevent Congress or any European ally from obtaining 
knowledge of this program through a process that would become formally known as “negative 
guidance.” Nixon’s executive branch sought to indirectly circumvent the Atomic Energy Act 
restrictions against the transfer of nuclear weapons design information by having the French send 
summaries of the technical problems. The U.S. would then respond with advice on whether the 
technological steps the French were taking or were contemplating were in the right direction, and 
follow-up talks would ensue. In “The Covert French Connection,” Ullman reveals how the 
French received U.S. advice on nuclear weapons development: “Typically, a request would come 
from the Elysee to the White House for specific categories of information requiring the 
cooperation of officials in the Pentagon. They would cut the list down so as to stay within their 
view…of what might be done under existing legislation.”112 Through this strategy, U.S. could 
assist France without the consent of Congress, or violate its commitments to SALT, the NPT, 
and the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).  
Between 1968-1973, the French pressed the U.S. for further aid, eventually expanding 
their list to include the hardening of RVs, penetration aids, multiple warheads for submarine 
missiles, weight/size of booster triggers, and assistance with underground testing.113 As a result 
of such assistance, the French were able to build a more effective and reliable nuclear force 
while remaining out of the NATO defense structure. 
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V. Conclusions  
 
When Princeton Professor Robert Ullman broke the story of the Nixon administration’s 
nuclear assistance to France in his Foreign Policy article titled “The Convert French Action” in 
1989, he characterized the program as shocking and unprecedented.114 However, an examination 
of the both the decision-making and policy implementation process reveals that U.S. nuclear 
assistance to France unfolded slowly and was somewhat cautious. Nixon officials were aware 
that America’s investment in France’s nuclear arsenal did not come without potential 
controversies and political dilemmas. Consequently, they designed the assistance program in a 
way that would grant them plausible deniability. As detailed above, the Nixon administration did 
not come to the conclusion to aid France under one coherent strategic or security interests. 
Rather, policymakers appeared to weight the risks of the nuclear aid program alongside U.S. 
interests of concluding SALT and maintaining good relations with its European allies. The 
following chapter will evaluate the decision and strategic debates related to nuclear assistance 
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Chapter IV: To Offer or Not Offer Nuclear Aid?: Assessing the Nixon 














































































Table 2: Summary of Conditions and U.S. nuclear assistance to France, 1953-1969 
 
As U.S. policymakers assumed that France would become a nuclear “power of some 
significance” whether the U.S. government assisted the country or not, there were two different 
policy options that the each administration could have chosen to adopt towards the French 
nuclear assistance: formal opposition or support.115 This chapter addresses and evaluates the 
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series of competing theories in explaining U.S. officials’ decision to offer nuclear aid to France. I 
argue that the theories pertaining to nuclear nonproliferation norms, the Soviet threat, and 
strength of NATO alliance, fail to explain both the timing, decision-making process, and final 
decision of whether the U.S. offered nuclear aid to France across all four administrations. In 
periods where there was a low Soviet threat and/or weakened NATO alliance relations, the U.S. 
offered nuclear assistance to France when we would least expect it. Conversely, in periods 
characterized by high Soviet threat and strong NATO relations, U.S. officials fell short of 
offering nuclear aid to France. Given such contradictory outcomes, I argue that the U.S. 
formulated its nuclear assistance program in response to particular political opportunities and 
incentives that were connected more to bilateral relations with France at the time rather than 
grand theories related to the threat level in the international environment, robustness of nuclear 
nonproliferation norms, or the strength of the NATO alliance.  
 
I. Strength of Nuclear Nonproliferation Norms  
 
According to theories of nuclear nonproliferation, as the norm against nuclear proliferation 
strengthens over time, this should reduce a country’s incentive offer nuclear assistance to another 
state because the reputational costs increase. Although there was a succession of initiatives 
beginning in the 1950s that sought to check nuclear proliferation, I argue that the Treaty on 
Nuclear Nonproliferation (NPT) marks the most significant agreement that generated the 
international norms against nuclear nonproliferation by serving as the foundation for a near-
universal nuclear nonproliferation regime. Thus, prior to the ratification of the NPT in 1968, U.S. 
                                                 




officials should have offered nuclear assistance to France. The permissive international 
environment, characterized by weak norms against nuclear proliferation and the lack formal U.S. 
commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, should have prompted U.S. policymakers to 
offer nuclear assistance to France because there were little to no costs to implementing such 
initiative. After the implementation of the NPT, the U.S. should not have offered nuclear 
assistance to France because it would have generated significant international backlash for 
appearing to violate its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. 
At a first glance, the Eisenhower administration’s pursuit of the MLF and NATO 
stockpile plan to increase allied’ access to nuclear weapons appears to be consistent with this 
theory of nonproliferation norms. In the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration demonstrated its 
strong support for nuclear sharing and assistance by approving the provision of ballistic missile 
designs to NATO allies, and embraced the notion of providing the British with intermediate-
range ballistic missile (IRBMs). U.S. policymakers even expressed an interest in providing West 
Germany with effective control over American nuclear weapons.116 Eisenhower and other U.S. 
officials believed that the idea of denying nuclear weapons away from its allies was “almost 
insane” and “silly.”117 These initiatives were designed to pave the way for “an independent and 
ultimately purely European nuclear force, whose use would not be subject to an American 
veto.”118 Likewise, President Johnson’s formal opposition to offering France nuclear assistance 
in 1964 appears to parallel his administration’s efforts at the time regarding arms control 
agreements with the Soviet Union. This suggests that nuclear nonproliferation norms may have 
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influenced the Eisenhower and Johnson administration’s broad attitudes towards offering nuclear 
assistance to a state. 
However, the validity of the argument that norms associated with the NPT could explain 
U.S. nuclear assistance is contested when one examines Eisenhower’s divergent nuclear 
assistance policies between Britain and France. Given the absence of the NPT in the 1950s, we 
would expect the Eisenhower administration to offer nuclear assistance to both European states. 
Yet Britain was the only beneficiary of the amended Atomic Energy Act in 1954 and 1958, 
which allowed the U.S. to share substantial nuclear information and materials to aid Britain’s 
construction of nuclear submarines. In contrast, France was “freezed-out” of this growing special 
nuclear relationship between the U.S. and U.K.  
The theory of nuclear nonproliferation norms also fails to explain why President Nixon 
offered nuclear assistance to France two years after the U.S. signed the NPT. Although Nixon 
and Kissinger had ambivalent attitudes towards nuclear nonproliferation because both 
policymakers placed “a higher priority on superpower geopolitics,” their support of the NPT and 
pursuit of other arms control policies (i.e.: Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, SALT) suggests 
that they did not advocate for proliferation to every country that wished to acquire nuclear 
weapons.119 Given the administration’s foreign policy objective of preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons and weapons technology, the timing of Nixon’s decision to offer nuclear 
assistance to France is puzzling. As argued by Martha Finnemore, hypocritical policy decisions 
and actions can constrain a state’s legitimacy and power in the international system by 
“undermining the willingness of other states to accept or defer to the actions of the power.”120 In 
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this logic, it is unclear then why the Nixon administration was willing to secretly support the 
development of France’s arsenal, as such action risked contradicting America’s commitment to 
existing arms control agreements. Given these unexpected outcomes, it seems implausible to 
argue that nuclear nonproliferation norms were a plausible factor driving U.S. decision-making 
regarding nuclear assistance to France across all four administrations.  
 
II. Relative Strength of the NATO Alliance 
 
Based on alliance politics theories, as the strength of an alliance increases, this will lead 
states to cooperate more in general. Conversely, the weakening or breakdown of an alliance 
would result in greater mistrust and thus less cooperation between the members of an alliance. 
The relative strength of any alliance is difficult to test and measure, as one could argue alliances 
are rarely in absolute harmony or discord. In particular, U.S relations with its NATO allies have 
always been in flux since its formulation in 1949. However, for the purposes of this thesis, I 
define “strong alliance relations” as periods where relations between NATO members are 
relatively cooperative. This is demonstrated by the presence of collaborative security efforts 
within the NATO alliances, such as the adoption of multilateral treaties and agreements. 
Conversely, I define “weak alliance relations” as periods where relations among allies are tense 
and fractured, determined by the presence of disagreements and disengagement. In the case of 
NATO, we should expect the nuclear assistance to be offered at moments when transatlantic 
relations were strong and U.S. and European policymakers had favorable attitudes towards 
NATO institutions. During periods of transatlantic tensions and institutional strife within NATO, 
we would expect the U.S. to not offer nuclear assistance. Within the context of U.S.-French 
nuclear relations, nuclear assistance should thus exist prior to 1960, when France was still 
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integrated in NATO’s military command and before the Vietnam War and European Economic 
Community (ECC) introduced significant tensions in the NATO relationship. 
The 1950s was arguably period of “strong” alliance relations between the U.S. and its 
NATO allies. Most notably, the U.S. military went to great lengths to assure its allies’ security in 
this period, stationing tens of thousands of U.S. troops on European soil and provisioning large 
sums of military aid.121 NATO adopted its strategic military doctrine of “massive retaliation” 
(MC 48/2), the idea that if any member was attacked, the U.S. would respond with a large-scale 
nuclear attack. Thus, President Eisenhower’s willingness to offer nuclear assistance to America’s 
NATO allies through the MLF policy, NATO stockpile initiative, and amendments to the Atomic 
Energy Act during this period appears to reflect the notion that strong alliance relations could 
encourage more cooperation in the nuclear realm. As Wohlstetter argues, Congress’ 
liberalization of the Atomic Energy act “seem[ed] to offer incentives to our other [Western 
European] allies to demonstrate a nuclear capability of their own, and so to become eligible for 
help.”122 Given strong NATO relations, we would expect U.S. officials to offer nuclear 
assistance to France in this period. However, as noted above, Eisenhower administration had 
divergent attitudes about offering nuclear assistance to Britain and France. The French were 
denied the same extent and type of nuclear assistance that was offered to Britain. These two 
differing nuclear policy outcomes suggest that despite “warm” U.S.-NATO relations in the 
1950s, the strength of the intra-alliance had little correlation with Eisenhower’s decision not to 
offer nuclear assistance to France.  
While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to sufficiently detail and outline the state of 
transatlantic relations during the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administration, several significant 
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historical events reveal that U.S.-NATO relations reached one of its lowest points in the 1960s. 
As summarized by Ludlow, Europe's economic recovery and Washington's preoccupation with 
other regions of the world endangered the unity of the alliance. French and German leaders 
persistently doubted the durability and credibility of U.S. security guarantees. In particular, 
French leaders criticized and challenged the uneven distribution of power and leadership 
positions within NATO’s military command.123 In January 1963, de Gaulle rejected Britain’s 
entry into the ECC. Three years later, de Gaulle undermined the unity of NATO by withdrawing 
all French troops from NATO’s military command. Therefore, one can characterize the 1960s as 
a period of “uncertainty and doubt” for the NATO alliance.124  
President Johnson’s formal opposition to French nuclear assistance in 1964 suggests a 
plausible correlation between the strength of an alliance and the likelihood of nuclear assistance. 
In the NSAM 294, officials asserted that it was not in America’s interest to assist French’s 
nuclear warhead capabilities because it was outside the NATO nuclear force: “it is the policy of 
this government to oppose the development of nuclear forces by additional states, other than 
those whose forces would be assigned as part of a NATO nuclear force, targeted in accordance 
with NATO plans.”125 One could argue that this statement suggests the Johnson administration 
did not offer nuclear assistance to France because an additional independent European nuclear 
force would further undermine a NATO alliance that was already weak and in disarray. 
However, the alliance politics theory is challenged when it is applied to assess U.S. government 
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decision-making processes in other presidential administrations. Kennedy and Nixon’s 
consideration and favorable attitudes towards the idea of offering nuclear assistance to France 
despite the tense U.S.-NATO relations is arguably the most perplexing. Although Kennedy 
publicly opposed offering nuclear aid to Paris in fear that this would encourage Bonn to seek its 
own independent nuclear deterrent outside of NATO, it is critical to note that Kennedy privately 
demonstrated an interest in offering nuclear assistance to France. Likewise, it is perplexing why 
Nixon offered nuclear assistance after France left NATO, an act that severely damaged the unity 
of NATO. 
A more nuanced explanation might argue that the U.S.-French nuclear assistance 
initiative during the Nixon administration may have been designed to repair a fragmenting 
NATO alliance. After France left NATO’s military command in 1966, Nixon officials actively 
sought ways to improve America’s political and defense relations with its European allies. 
However, if such broad desires to strengthen NATO relations drove U.S. policymakers to offer 
nuclear assistance, we would expect evidence of U.S. policymakers to tie nuclear assistance to 
France to political preconditions of France rejoining NATO’s military structure. However, 
internal documents reveal that officials intentionally avoided tying U.S. nuclear assistance to 
France to NATO. As noted in Chapter 3, Kissinger explicitly informed Nixon not to discuss or 
mention NATO with the French prior to his meeting with Pompidou. In another conversation 
between Kissinger and Pompidou, Kissinger assured the French leader that “[Nixon] would not 
bring up anything relating to the return of France to the military organization of NATO."126 
The alliance politics argument is also quite difficult to sustain when one examines the 
Nixon administration’s perceived function of the NATO alliance. When NATO was established 
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in 1949, its primary purpose was to deter Soviet expansionism. However, by the Nixon 
administration, officials expressed a desire to transform and reshape NATO beyond a defense 
alliance. For example, Nixon’s speech to members of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels for 
NATO’s 20th anniversary outlined the need for a new military, political and a social dimension 
to NATO’s role of “collective security,” as opposed to its previous objective of “collective 
defense.127 As U.S. officials perceived and publicly presented NATO more as a political 
institution than an effective defense structure, it seems unlikely that Washington would have 
been willing to undertake such significant and risky effort as a way to bolster the NATO alliance. 
Overall, the empirical evidence provides little support for the idea that the strength of the NATO 
alliance determined the U.S. decision to offer nuclear assistance to France. 
 
III. Changes in the Soviet Threat 
 
The third alternative explanation focuses on changes in the Soviet threat as the crucial 
factor driving U.S. policymakers’ decision whether or not to offer nuclear assistance to France. 
We would expect that as the Soviet threat increases, U.S. officials would pursue nuclear 
assistance as a way to strengthen its extended nuclear deterrence. Thus, as Soviet conventional 
and nuclear parity in the early 1960s challenged America’s extended deterrence commitments to 
its allies, the assumption is that U.S. policymakers would offer nuclear assistance to France as a 
way to create independent nuclear forces in Western Europe. As scholars have noted, the U.S. 
and Soviet Union reached nuclear parity by the Cuban missile crisis. Thus, we would expect the 
U.S. to not offer nuclear assistance until after 1963. In contrast, the easing of tensions in U.S.-
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Soviet relations by 1969 would decrease the level of the Soviet threat and result in the U.S. not 
offering nuclear assistance.  
The Eisenhower’s pursuit of the MLF plan, and demonstrated willingness to offer nuclear 
assistance to France and Britain during a period when European allies questioned the credibility 
of U.S. extended deterrence, appears to fit the Soviet threat theory. However, the Soviet threat 
theory fails to explain why the Nixon administration would offer nuclear assistance to France 
during a period of détente with the Soviet Union. His administration was undergoing the SALT 
negotiations with the Soviets in 1969, an international agreement that sought to freeze the 
number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing levels to curb the race in strategic 
offensive arms. The agreement also prohibited the transfer of anti-ballistic missile systems to 
other states, as well as providing “other States technical descriptions or blueprints of the ABM 
systems prohibited by the Treaty.”128 Since the U.S.-French nuclear assistance program would 
violate the no transfer component of the treaty, officials did note that this could have a negative 
consequence for the prospects of the SALT deal.129 Sonnenfeldt’s remark below suggests 
sensitivity to U.S.-Soviet tensions, noting that although aiding France could “make life more 
complicated for the Soviets,” other U.S. foreign policy interests would suffer if the initiative was 
leaked and made aware to the Soviets:  
"Those who point to SALT as an inhibition on our policies have a legitimate point. If 
SALT effort is aimed at creating a more stable and strategic relationship with the USSR, 
it is not compatible with a simultaneous effort to create additional nuclear power centers 
in the West, which could be in time destabilizing (as far as the Soviets are concerned) and 
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perhaps jeopardize the basic SALT understanding"130   
 
 
Given that détente was one of his top foreign policy priorities, we would expect the Nixon to not 
offer nuclear assistance to France because such initiative would have increased U.S.-Soviet 
tensions. Yet the Nixon administration interestingly separated the question of France’s nuclear 
arsenal from U.S.-Soviet ties. 
 
 
IV. Political Opportunism in U.S.-French Relations 
 
The alternative explanations outlined above only offer binary expectations, implicitly 
suggesting that U.S.’ decision to offer nuclear assistance to France was straight-forward and 
deterministic. However, the available empirical evidence highlights how U.S. decision-making 
towards offering nuclear assistance fluctuated. Exploratory talks included instances where the 
U.S. considered and favored French nuclear assistance but fell short of implementing such 
initiative. I argue that political opportunism within U.S.-French bilateral relations can capture 
and explain the initial ambivalent attitudes towards nuclear assistance, as well as why the U.S. 
only offered nuclear assistance to the French during the Nixon administration.  
While the Eisenhower administration did not offer nuclear assistance to France, U.S. 
officials demonstrated a strong willingness to pursue such initiative. It is critical to note that 
Eisenhower was “not convinced that a French nuclear capability was detrimental to U.S. 
interests.”131 Rather, empirical evidence suggests that the Eisenhower did not offer nuclear 
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assistance to France because of domestic and international constraints. From a legal perspective, 
the amendments made to the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 restricted any form of nuclear 
assistance to only Britain. According to the act, the U.S. could only offer aid another country’s 
nuclear program if the country had already made “sufficient progress” in the development of 
their nuclear arsenal prior to aid. Aside from the congressional constraints that legally prohibited 
the U.S. from offering nuclear assistance to other European allies, France’s domestic and 
international political developments made its efforts in establishing a national nuclear deterrent 
appear unattractive and risky to U.S. policymakers in comparison to the British case. Officials 
perceived France’s political instability as a sign of lack of capability to act responsibly with 
nuclear arms, and feared that France would use nuclear weapons to protect and maintain its 
overseas colonies.132 Moreover, de Gaulle’s continued challenge against “American security 
design” for Europe undermined Eisenhower’s ongoing efforts at controlling the spread of nuclear 
capabilities within the NATO alliance.133 Finally, if Eisenhower offered nuclear assistance to 
France, it would have been helping France acquire a nuclear weapon and not refine an existing 
capability. Thus, the overall opportunity to offer nuclear assistance to France was not compelling 
in this period.  
Likewise, the Kennedy administration’s privately may have been open to offering nuclear 
aid to France, but a hostile domestic and international environment appears to be the most 
compelling explanation for why it fell short of offering nuclear assistance. Similar to the 
Eisenhower administration, U.S. officials at this time were still concerned about nuclear 
proliferation to West Germany. Kennedy expressed this sentiment to British Prime Minister 
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Harold Macmillan, asserting: “If we were now to provide aid to France and thus signify a major 
reversal in our opposition to Nth country programs the likelihood that the Germany would 
eventually wish to acquire a nuclear weapons capability would be significantly increased.”134 
These remarks suggests that concerns about how West Germany would perceive U.S. nuclear 
assistance to France thwarted any efforts towards implementing an official nuclear assistance 
program. As summarized by President Kennedy, “The United States…had not supported the 
French in the nuclear field and the result of this policy had been to sour American relations with 
France. Rightly or wrongly they had taken this attitude because of this Germany. If the United 
States did help France then pressure in Germany for similar help would rise.”135 Thus, while 
“pragmatism compelled Kennedy” to consider nuclear assistance to France, the ongoing Berlin 
crisis narrowed his choice for dealing with France’s nuclear program.”136 
While there remains a significant limitation to available sources that traces the Johnson 
administration’s attitudes towards the French nuclear arsenal, one could speculate that the 
Johnson administration’s sudden shift from ambivalence to hostility was due to the following 
international events: China’s nuclear test in 1964, the Gilpatric Commission, France’s 1966 
withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command, and a growing U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam. The Gilpatric Committee warned that “The world is fast approaching a point of no 
return in the prospects of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons...The recent Chinese 
Communist nuclear explosion has reinforced the belief, increasingly prevalent throughout the 
world, that nuclear weapons are a distinguishing mark of a world leader, are essential to national 
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security, and are feasible even with modest industrial resources.”137 Given the timing of the 
Johnson administration’s implementation of the NSSM 294, this restricted international 
environment appeared to pressure U.S. officials to formally oppose rather than support nuclear 
assistance to France.  
On the surface, Nixon appears as the least likely candidate to have risked nuclear 
assistance, given the state of NATO and détente. However, the Nixon administration arguably 
had the most political space and flexibility in U.S. nuclear policy. What was different about the 
political context in 1970 that allowed for the U.S. to offer nuclear assistance to France? I argue 
that three factors paved the way for nuclear assistance. First, the change in the French 
government signaled a new opportunity for the U.S. officials to work with the French in the 
nuclear realm. In February 1970, Georges Pompidou succeeded de Gaulle as the president of 
France. There is indeed evidence that suggests that Nixon administration saw Pompidou’s 
leadership as an advantageous opportunity to restart U.S.-French policy, as Pompidou was “was 
a Gaullist but he was not de Gaulle.”138 As observed by Trachtenberg, the Nixon administration:  
“admired Pompidou as a person. They liked the way the French tended to think in cool, 
realistic, power political terms. They tended to view France as the most “European” of 
the European allies, saying things that the other European governments did not dare to 
say out loud—and that meant that in dealing with France as something of a privileged 
partner, they were really in a sense dealing with western Europe as a whole.”139  
 
Second, the period of “strategic parity” with the Soviet Union presented an opportunity to 
offer nuclear aid to France without undermining U.S. national security or risk provoking Soviet 
backlash. As Teriff writes, throughout the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, the U.S. 
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deployed a large strategic nuclear arsenal to maintain a position of nuclear superiority against the 
USSR.140 However, by 1969, the USSR almost reached the same number of land-based ballistic 
missiles as the U.S., challenging the era of U.S. nuclear supremacy.141 Sonnenfeldt’s positive 
assessment of U.S. nuclear assistance draws on this notion, arguing that: “It is also true that the 
French forces.. cannot be regarded as very threatening in a world that permits the U.S. and USSR 
2,000 missiles and heavy bombers.”142 Likewise, Nixon’s NSC concluded that a U.S.-French 
nuclear assistance program “it is not predicted that the Soviets could…withdraw from an 
agreement [SALT] once made, if this were the only point at issue and if the assistance could not 
realistically be interpreted as substantially changing the strategic balance.”143  
Third, on the U.S. domestic front, an examination of internal discussions and debates 
reveals that the Nixon administration had a receptive bureaucracy in comparison to earlier 
administrations. Aside from the head of the ACDA, Nixon officials were generally supportive of 
offering nuclear assistance to the French. There was a persistent and an unwavering belief that 
U.S nuclear assistance to France could be done “below the board” and in a way that was 
deniable. Overall, a combination of these three factors played a critical role in pushing the U.S. 
to assist the French arsenal in 1970. 
The argument for political opportunism is further supported during the later years of the 
U.S.-French nuclear assistance program. In 1973, U.S. and French officials expressed an interest 
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in the possibility of deepening the nuclear relationship, but such requests came at a time when 
U.S.-French relations were threatened by Kissinger's "Year of Europe" initiative.144 French 
foreign minister Michel Jobert perceived the "Year of Europe" as a plan to bring France’s 
nuclear weapons back into NATO.145 As noted by Burr, Kissinger attempted to ‘"use" the French 
to break European unity, thus encouraging an "orientation" that was more compatible with U.S. 
interests. By exacerbating the Anglo-French nuclear rivalry, Kissinger could "keep Europe from 
developing their unity as a bloc against us."’146 Confronted with difficulties over the “Year of 
Europe,” it appears that Kissinger may have desired to use military aid to tie France closer to the 
United States to strengthen U.S.-French relations during a period where it was most 
advantageous to the U.S. Given this political context, it would have been puzzling if nuclear 






As demonstrated above, the existing theories of nuclear proliferation do not provide 
satisfactory explanations for the character, timing, and the conditions under which U.S. decided 
nuclear assistance to France occurred. While theories of alliance politics, the Soviet threat and 
nuclear nonproliferation norms can explain the lack, or presence of, U.S. nuclear assistance to 
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France in some cases, it cannot be broadly applied. The evidence presented in this chapter 
largely supports the theoretical argument that political opportunism drove the Nixon 
administration’s decision to offer aid to France. This theory also offers a more compelling 
explanation for both the wide variation in U.S. nuclear assistance policies towards France. 
During the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administration, U.S. officials were restrained by  
domestic and international politics, in which French interests appeared to conflict with broader 
U.S. foreign policy interests. However, under the Nixon administration, the coincident of U.S.-
French interests allowed for nuclear assistance to occur. The following chapter concludes with 























Chapter V: Conclusion 
 
This thesis reveals that existing theories fail to explain why the U.S. offered nuclear 
assistance to France in 1970. Arguments that contend that states are driven to provide nuclear 
assistance to an ally by economic profit and security motives do not find strong support in the 
empirical evidence. I demonstrate that in order to explain the shift in U.S. nuclear assistance to 
France, one must look and consider the broader political context of U.S. foreign policy decision-
making. Overall, the picture we observe is one more of continuity from Eisenhower through 
Nixon than previously assumed. Despite shifts in the Soviet threat, NATO alliance, and nuclear 
nonproliferation norms, U.S. policymakers surprisingly and consistently demonstrated a 
willingness to offer nuclear assistance to France. In addition, the Nixon administration’s decision 
to offer nuclear assistance to France was more cautious and careful than one might have 
imagined. These findings have implications for U.S. nuclear policy and potential research, which 
will be discussed below.  
 
Implications for Nuclear Theories and Avenues for Future Research 
 
The current conventional wisdom is that after a state successfully conducts it first nuclear 
test, it immediately poses significant threat to the security of the U.S. and its allies. Thus, 
inhibiting nuclear proliferation has been a critical and pertinent aspect of U.S. foreign policy 
since the Cold War. However, this notion has not always the case. The U.S.-French nuclear 
assistance case challenges the traditional historiography on U.S. nuclear policy by revealing that 
a) the U.S. did not always condemn actions that would contribute to nuclear proliferation during 
the Cold War and b) the U.S. did perceive the risks of nuclear proliferation to its allies to the 
same extent as unaligned and adversary states.  
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On a broader note, the thesis’ analysis suggests that a state’s decision to offer nuclear 
assistance is driven less by strategic concerns about the level of the threat in the international 
system or the state of alliance politics. However, the uniqueness of the U.S.-French nuclear 
assistance case raises three critical questions that should be explored in further research. First, it 
is worth testing the applicability of the political opportunism theory to other historic cases of 
nuclear assistance. Second, due to the limited access to archival sources, this thesis is unable 
trace or track the debates that may have existed in different bureaucracies. Yet a plausible 
explanation to the U.S.-French case is that members of the Defense Department pushed for such 
initiative. Third, given that offering nuclear assistance inherently contributes to nuclear 
proliferation, it remains unclear what are the costs and consequences of a state offering nuclear 
assistance, and whether the extent and type of assistance generates different outcomes. Although 
the U.S-French case did not spark any international backlash due to its secretive nature, critics in 
have argued that the current civilian nuclear assistance program between the U.S. and India has 
undermined U.S. nonproliferation efforts and risks provoking an arms race in Asia. Given 
current weakened and tense U.S. relations with its allies that have expressed a desire for 
independent nuclear forces, such as South Korea and Japan, the theory of political opportunism 
may also shed light on when the U.S. may offer such security assistance. Therefore, scholars 
should further investigate these puzzles in order to refine and enrich our understanding of the 
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